Please replace unsafe SHA1 with another digest algorithm
When working on a new version of RHEL (with Ruby 3.0), the requirement is to have a better security (remove unsafe digests or limit the use for non-security purposes). This would be achieved with using OpenSSL 3.0 as well, which will have a raised security level by default, forbidding the use of unsafe digests.
SHA-1 does not conform to the security requirements, and its replacement would be preferred.
A quote from the discussion (the Bug is marked as internal):
SHA-1 is still possible to use for non-security use cases, but it we should try to prevent their use for signatures if possible. The Python took a way to prevent this using non-mandatory argument usedforsecurity=True to the constructor, which lets the programmers to indicate their intention explicitly and policy-makers to verify no SHA1 is used in security context.   https://docs.python.org/3/library/hashlib.html#hashlib.new
AFAICT in Ruby it is used for non-security purposes only. Could you confirm that?
The use for non-security purposes might be indicated with setting an internal variable, which would allow the use of SHA-1 (although forbidden via OpenSSL setting). Do you think this would be possible?
The failing tests upon SHA-1 removal in Ruby 3.0.2: https://gist.github.com/pvalena/9a053c5585329b595e2bff504198eba5
Updated by retro (Josef Šimánek) 7 months ago
AFAIK SHA-1 is used in Bundler/RubyGems only to hash filepath for gem clones and could be replaced in the future. It was recently vendored in bundler and could be vendored into RubyGems as well.
It can be changed to different hashing algo, but it will not be backwards compatible and proper migration plan should be prepared first.
Updated by jeremyevans0 (Jeremy Evans) 7 months ago
We still support
digest/rmd160, and I doubt those are more secure than SHA-1. If the operating system OpenSSL doesn't include support for old digests, then Ruby's openssl extension will not either (though the digest extension may).
I don't think Ruby should remove old digests, simply because they can be used improperly. There are proper uses. For example, using MD5 or SHA1 as the digest for an HMAC is still considered secure as far as I know. I'm fine updating the documentation to recommend against direct use of old digests for cryptographic purposes. I'm also fine updating the test suite so it passes if old digests are removed, by skipping the related tests.